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III. JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, which was obtained
upon assignment from the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court originally
obtained jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-3(j) (1958 as amended).
VI. ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL
Issue: Did the Trial Court err when it found that the defendant paid the
plaintiff for her interest in the Company awarded by the Decree of Divorce?
This issue is a question of fact. Accordingly, the trial court's findings
should not be set aside upon appellate review unless it is determined that the trial court's
determination was clearly erroneous. Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah 1984).
Issue: Did the Trial Court err when it found that the statute of limitation set
forth in U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) barred plaintiff's action to enforce paragraph 3b of the
Decree of Divorce?
The issue as to whether U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) or another statue of limitation
applies to paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce is a question of law which should be
reviewed for "correctness." Gramlich v. Munsev. 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992). The
issue as to whether an applicable statute of limitation was suspended by estoppel, lulled,
or tolled, is a question of fact, which should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard. Brower v. Brown. 744 P.2d 1337. 138-39 (Utah 1987).
Issue: Did the Trial Court err in failing to address the issue of a
constructive trust or to find that a constructive existed in favor of the plaintiff?

1

The issue of whether a court should impose a constructive trust is primarily
a question of fact. Mattes v. Olearain. 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court
found that the plaintiff had previously received payment for her interest in the Company
and accordingly did not make findings concerning the plaintiffs theory of constructive
trust. The primary question on appeal is whether the trial court should have addressed the
issue despite the court's finding that no continuing interest existed to be held in trust.
Issue: Did the Trial Court render a decision on an issue not presented
before it for determination?
Findings made by a court that are not requested by the parties or which are
based on issues neither raised nor trial are carefully scrutinized on review. Combe v.
Warren's Family Drive-Inns. Inc.. 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984). There exists however, a
preliminary issue as together this scenario is presented by the case at hand, which may be
determined by a review of the record.
Issue: Did the trial court err in failing to issue discovery sanctions against
the defendant?
A decision as to whether sanctions on discovery are appropriate is primarily
the prerogative of the trial court but is reviewable for error upon appeal. See Morton v.
Continental Banking Co.. 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1977). This issue may be determined by a
review of the records and the orders of the court.

2

VI. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF STATUTES & RULES
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22
An action may be brought within eight years:
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or
territory within the United States;
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide support or
maintenance for dependent children.

VII. STATEMENT OF CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This appeal stems from plaintiff/appellant's filing of an order to show cause
that requested several types of relief, including an affirmation, calculation, and delivery
of plaintiff s interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc. (hereinafter "the Company"), and
requests for an accounting of the current assets of the Company. (R. 328). All of
plaintiffs requests were pursuant to paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce, which reads
as follows: "[The Plaintiff is awarded] [o]ne-half (1/2) of Defendant's interest in
Kessimakis Produce, Inc., whether the same be evidenced by stock certificate or
otherwise and the Defendant is ordered to execute and deliver appropriate instruments
evidencing the transfer of such interest." (R. 19-20).
Defendant contended that he had already paid the plaintiff for her interest
and that plaintiffs action was untimely. The trial court held for the defendant on both
counts. The same issues are appealed by the plaintiff.
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B. Procedural History
The Decree of Divorce was entered on August 28, 1974. The case was
appealed on two previous occasions, with the second appeal concluding in 1978. The
language of paragraph 3b was unchanged by the appeals process.
Plaintiff/appellant filed an order to show cause on November 10, 1994, seeking
enforcement of paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce. (R. 328). The order to show cause
was heard by Commissioner Arnett, who recommended that the action be dismissed as it
was barred by the statute of limitations. (R. 348). Plaintiff objected to the commissioner's
recommendations (R. 349-366, 375-378). Defendant filed a memorandum in support of
the recommendations (R. 367-374).
Before the objection was resolved with Judge Pat Brian, plaintiff set a
second hearing before the commissioner, seeking a determination that defendant had not
delivered the interest, the same relief already requested in paragraph 2 of the original
order to show cause. (R. 328, 387). The commissioner recommended that no delivery of
the shares had been made as no documentary evidence had been located at that time.1 (R.
454). Defendant objected to the proposed order. (R. 459-65, 500-02, 510-13).
At the time plaintiff requested the second hearing, she also filed written
discovery requests and, later, a subpoena duces tecum requesting, among other things,
current financial information from the Company. (R. 404, 455).

1

Prior to the second hearing, Judge Brian signed the plaintiffs proposed order, which was not in conformity with
the commissioner's recommendation of dismissal, because he had not noticed defendant's objections. (R. 409).
Judge Brian later signed an order verifying that the statute of limitations was an issue in the case in order to correct
the mistake. (R. 531).
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A hearing on the plaintiffs objection to the recommendation of dismissal
was held before Judge Brian on February 27, 1996. Both parties filed trial briefs prior to
the hearing (R. 521, 532). The judge issued a minute entry stating that it would review
the statute of limitations question. (R. 539). Thereafter, Judge Brian issued a minute entry
stating that the statute of limitations set forth in U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) was applicable to
plaintiffs action. (R. 547).
The parties were unable to agree on an order and the parties again met with
Judge Brian on December 5, 1996, and made proffers of testimony and evidence. At that
time, the court made specific rulings on the outstanding discovery issues, ordered
discovery on limited issues, and continued the matter. (R. 598-601).
C. Disposition at the Trial Court
A bench trial was held on May 28, 1997 (R. 614) and was concluded on
October 2, 1997. (R. 631). The trial court issued findings and an order on October 17,
1998, holding, among other things, (1) that the defendant had paid plaintiff for her
interest under paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce, (2) that defendant had not waived
the statute of limitations defense, (3) that U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) barred plaintiffs action,
and (4) that plaintiff did not establish any lulling, tolling, or other defense to the running
of the statute of limitations. This appeal followed.
VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. and Mrs. Kessimakis were divorced on August 23, 1974. (R. 19).
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Paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce reads: "[The Plaintiff is awarded]
[o]ne-half (1/2) of Defendant's interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., whether the same be
evidenced by stock certificate or otherwise and the Defendant is ordered to execute and
deliver appropriate instruments evidencing the transfer of such interest." (R. 19).
The defendant appealed the Decree of Divorce on two occasions
(Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 580
P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978). The language of the Decree of Divorce was not altered in either
appeal.
At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce in 1974, the defendant
owned a Twenty percent (20%) interest in the Company. (R. 337).
The parties created a joint stock trading account administered by the
plaintiff's brother, Les Anderton, in 1980. (Tr. 17-18, 54, 81-82).
The defendant testified that he initially placed about $18,000 in the account
(Tr. 81). Plaintiff claimed in her deposition that she initially deposited "about five or
$6,000." (Deposition of Betty Kessimakis, p. 21).
Testimony at trial from the defendant and Mr. Anderton indicated that
approximately $26,000 in profits were paid out of the joint trading account in 1980. (Tr.
60-63, 117, 121, 124). This number was corroborated by defendant's introduction at trial
of trading receipts and an accounting of profits. (Tr. 60-63).
The plaintiff testified that the value of the Company in 1980 was
approximately $10,000 to $15,000. (Tr. 55). Plaintiff did not contradict this testimony.
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The defendant testified that he paid the plaintiff $21,000 to $24,000 of the
profits on the joint trading account in return for her interest in the Company in 1980 or
1981. (R. 337; Tr. 57-58, 82,98). Plaintiff denied that she received any funds from the
account. (Tr. 18-20,37-38).
Maintaining that she had not been paid, plaintiff testified that defendant
committed actions and made statements that constituted estoppel or a lulling or tolling of
the statute of limitations (Tr. 13-14, 21-25, 42-47, 152). Defendant denied the
allegations. (Tr. 59-60, 64, 88).

VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This appeal is brought by the plaintiff /appellant due to her dissatisfaction
with the trial court's factual findings. The trial court found, as a issue of fact, that in
1980, plaintiff received payment for the interest awarded to her in Kessimakis Produce,
Inc. pursuant to paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce. This finding should not be
disturbed absent a showing of clear error. The testimony and evidence support the trial
court's decision.
The other issues raised by the appellant are secondary to the issue of
payment. If the payment issue is upheld, there is no need to address them. Appellant
argues that defendant/appellee's assertion of the affirmative defense of statute of
limitations was waived; that no statute of limitations applies to paragraph 3b of the
Decree; and that in the event the statute of limitations does apply, its running was
estopped, lulled, or tolled. The statute of limitations was not waived. It was raised by the
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very first responsive document that was filed by the defendant and was extensively
discussed and briefed by both parties before the trial court. The case law from this
jurisdiction and others show that paragraph 3b of the Decree is indeed subject to a statute
of limitations, specifically U.C.A. §78-12-22(1). Finally, the court made a factual
finding, after hearing extensive testimony, that there was no estoppel, lulling, or tolling of
the running of the statute of limitations.
Appellant raises another secondary issue, claiming that the trial court
committed error by failing to address the issue of a constructive trust. Because the trial
court found that plaintiff/appellant's interest in the Company ceased in 1980 when she
was paid for that interest, her theory that the interest was held in trust by the
defendant/appellee, thereby defeating the running of any statute of limitations, was moot.
The trial court did not err in failing to address this issue.
In another secondary issue, appellant claims the court committed error
(1) by making findings based on issues not properly before the court (i.e. the statute of
limitations she claims was waived) and (2) by granting relief that neither party requested.
The first assertion is the same issue as that raised above and the record and facts show
that the statute of limitations defense was properly raised before the court. In addition,
plaintiff does not dispute that the issue of payment, which was the primary reason for the
trial court's denial of plaintiffs claim, was properly before the court. As for the second
assertion, the trial court was fully justified in denying plaintiffs action as the denial was
a direct response to the relief requested by the plaintiff and the defendant.

8

Lastly, the appellant claims that appellee should be subject to sanctions for
failure to comply with discovery requests. The record shows that the judge first
suspended discovery and then specifically limited the discovery issues based on
defendant's motion for a protective order. The parties complied with the court's order
and there is no justification for sanctions.
Plaintiffs appeal requests the court to overturn findings of fact that were
clearly sustainable and justified by the facts and testimony before the trial court and is
frivolous in nature. The appellee should be awarded costs and attorney's fees incurred on
appeal.
IX. ARGUMENT
A. Did the Trial Court err when it found that the defendant
paid the plaintiff for her interest in the Company awarded
by the Decree of Divorce?
The trial court correctly found, based upon the evidence and testimony
before it, that the plaintiff was paid for her interest in the Company through the proceeds
of the joint stock trading account. This conclusion was based upon a factual
determination of the trial court.
The standard of review for this issue is the clearly erroneous standard. In
order to successfully challenge a trial court's factual findings, the appellant "must
marshal the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial courts findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear
weight of the evidence' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" In Re Estate of BartelL
776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
9

There is more than adequate evidence and testimony to substantiate defendant/appellee's
assertion that he paid the plaintiff for her interest in the Company eighteen years ago.
The defendant testified that he set up a joint stock trading account in his
and the plaintiffs names (Tr. 54, 81-82; confirmed by plaintiff Tr. 17-18) with the
understanding that the proceeds from the joint trading account were to be used to
purchase the plaintiffs interest in the Company. (Tr. 54-56). Plaintiff denied that this was
the purpose of the account. (Tr. 137-38). Defendant testified that the parties used the
plaintiffs brother, Les Anderton, as the stock broker on the account (Tr. 64) and that the
plaintiffs address was the primary address on the account. (Tr. 56). These two facts were
confirmed by Les Anderson in his testimony (Tr. 101-102, 122) and by the plaintiff (Tr.
17-18,35, 37, 49-50). Mr. Anderton also testified that the plaintiff had as much authority
over the trading account as the defendant and could freely withdraw funds. (Tr. 122).
Mr. Anderton testified that, according to company records, $26,245.65 was
paid out as earnings on the account. (Tr. 117, 121,124). The defendant produced carbon
copies of trading receipts from the trading account, a record of the stock trades prepared
by his secretary and girlfriend at the time the account was in existence, and a summary of
these records. (Tr. 60-63). This evidence was consistent with the accounting produced by
Les Anderton. No party was able to locate any cancelled checks, tax returns, or other
physical evidence as to where the profits from the account were distributed. Such records
would have been approximately 17 years old. Mr. Anderton testified that he did not know
the purpose for the account and that he did not know whether earnings went to the
plaintiff or defendant. (Tr. 117, 120-122). The defendant testified that he paid
10

approximately $21,000 to $24,000 of the earnings to the plaintiff. (R. 337; Tr. 57-58, 8182, 98-99). The plaintiff stated that she was not paid any funds from the account. (Tr. 1820, 37-38). However, the plaintiff also testified that she claimed one-half of the profits
from the account on her tax returns. (Tr. 22-23, 40).
The defendant testified that the value of the Company in 1980 was
approximately $10,000 to $15,000. (Tr. 55). At trial, the plaintiff offered no evidence or
testimony to contest defendant's valuation.
During trial, and now upon appeal, plaintiff claims that defendant "changed
his story" about the time and his method of payment for plaintiffs interest in the
Company. This assertion is not reasonable. In his response to the initial Order to Show
Cause, defendant stated the following in an affidavit: "In or about 1981 or 1982,1 paid to
the plaintiff the sum of approximately Twenty-one Thousand Dollars ($21,000.00) or
Twenty-two Thousand Dollars ($22,000.00) for the purchase of her interest in
Kessimakis Produce, Inc." (R. 337, fl). Plaintiff claims this statement is inconsistent
with defendant's later statements that the joint trading account was the source of funds
for the payment. At the time of the submission of the responsive affidavit, defendant had
not had reasonable opportunity to locate any 15-year-old records to enable him to specify
a specific date or amount for the payment. It was not until later that defendant was able to
find the joint stock trading account records that evidenced the payment. The stock trading
records very closely corroborate and support defendant's recollections, showing that
approximately $26,000 of profit was paid out of the joint account during 1980.
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Plaintiff also states that the defendant's changed because he claimed that he
had paid her off in cash. (Brief of Appellant, p. 18). Defendant's affidavit makes no such
claim. Defendant did testify at trial that he gave the trading account profits to the plaintiff
in cash as it was his practice to deal in cash at the time. (Tr. 57-59). Plaintiff admitted
that virtually all of defendant's alimony and child support payments were paid in cash
prior to her filing this action. (Tr. 145). There was no change in defendant's story. The
trial court agreed and found the defendant's testimony and evidence to be credible.
The plaintiffs testimony was less credible than the defendant's testimony.
Plaintiff testified that the account was merely a friendly investment between the parties
and that the defendant was trying to reconcile with her (Tr. 137-38), despite the fact that,
at the time, defendant had a live-in girlfriend, had a poor record of paying child support
(Tr. 51-52), and the parties had just undergone an extremely contentious divorce which
was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court twice.
Plaintiffs testimony apparently caused the trial court to question plaintiffs
veracity on other facts as well. When the defendant closed the joint account in 1981, he
transferred the existing balance of the account, approximately $36,000, into a personal
account in his name only. (Tr. 95-96, 124). The defendant said this was done because the
plaintiff had at that point been paid for her interest. (Tr. 95-96). However, the plaintiff
claimed that, in addition to her not receiving any of the profits of the account, she had
also been wronged by the defendant's transfer. (Tr. 39). She testified that she was "bitter"
about the transfer because the balance contained funds that she had placed in the account.
(Tr. 138-142). Despite this, plaintiff also admitted that she did not complain to the
12

defendant or Mr. Anderton, her brother, who was the broker for the account. (Tr. 39-40,
142-144, 153-156). Mr. Anderton also testified that the plaintiff did not inform him of
any concerns about payments from the account or its closing. (Tr. 123-125). These
inconsistencies were addressed by Judge Brian in a question to counsel during closing
statements (Tr. 172-173), indicating that the Judge may have had concerns about the
credibility of the plaintiffs testimony.
Finally, it should be noted that this action stems from plaintiffs order to
show cause which was first scheduled before a commissioner and then set for a review
and trial before Judge Brian. Plaintiffs assertion that the commissioner's findings are the
"law of the case" and are not changed by Judge Brian's findings after a full evidentiary
trial is untenable. The Utah Code of Judicial Administration states that "the
Commissioner's recommendation is the order of the court until modified by the court."
U.C.J.A. 6-401(4). Plaintiff objected to the commissioner's recommendation, properly
setting the matter for review before the judge pursuant to U.C.J.A. 6-401(5).
Accordingly, plaintiff's second hearing before the commissioner while the objection to
the first recommendation was still unresolved was improper.
It is the prerogative and, indeed, the duty of a trial court to attribute veracity
and weight to the testimony of witnesses and the evidence presented during a trial. A trial
court's determination of a factual issue should not be disturbed on appeal unless the
determination is clearly erroneous. Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah 1984); Teratron
General v. Institutional Investorv Trust, 569 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Wash. 1977) (stating that
"unraveling and deciphering of the evidence is a function of the trial judge, and we will
13

not upset his interpretation of the testimony when any reasonable view substantiates his
findings even though there may be other reasonable interpretations." (quoting Kaas v.
Privette, 529 P.2d 23,26 (Wash. 1974)). In the present case, the trial court made a
reasonable and well-founded decision that the plaintiff received money from the
defendant for the purpose of paying for her interest in the Company and that such funds
were sufficient to cover any interest she had been awarded in the Company. This decision
was based upon on the facts and evidence before the trial court and should not be
disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the trial court's interpretation of the facts was
clearly erroneous. The court's determination that the plaintiff had been paid for the
interest awarded to her pursuant to paragraph 3b the Decree should not be disturbed.
If the trial court's decision on this first issue discussed above is upheld,
there is no need to address the remaining, secondary, issues on appeal. If the plaintiff was
paid in 1980 for her interest awarded in paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce, the other
issues presented on appeal, other than the issue of discovery sanctions, are moot.
B. Did the Trial Court err when it found that the statute of
limitations barred plaintiffs action to enforce paragraph
3b of the Decree of Divorce?
L The defendant did not waive the affirmative defense of
statute of limitations or the other affirmative defenses
alleged to have been waived
The trial court found that even disregarding its finding that plaintiff was
paid for her interest in the Company, her action would have been barred by the statute of
limitations. The arguments on this issue and those that follow assume that these issues
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need only be addressed if it is determined by the appellate court that the trial court
committed clear error in finding that plaintiff was paid for her interest in the Company.
The affirmative defense of statute of limitations was not waived and was a
proper issue for the trial court to address. The plaintiff cites cases, including Tvgesen v.
Magna Water Co.. 375 P.2d 456 (Utah 1962) and American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom. 689
P.2d 1 (Utah 1984), to support her argument that an affirmative defense, specifically, a
statute of limitations, must be waived if it is not raised in a timely manner. These two
cases involve situations where the statute of limitations issue was raised for the first time
upon appeal. Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co.. 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1988)
involves a case where a party sought to amend his answer to include a statute of
limitations defense on the morning of trial. These situations are very different from that
presented in the present case.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the statute of limitations issue was
argued before the commissioner on the very first hearing on the law and motion calendar.
The issue was raised in the defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Order to Show Cause and
supporting Affidavit, the first documents filed by the defendant. The defendant noted that
significant time had passed since the entry of the Decree of Divorce and stated that "[t]he
plaintiff has not, since 1981, made any demand on the defendant for any evidence of
ownership of Kessimakis Produce, Inc., for financial information, notice of meetings or
otherwise...." (R. 345). While the defendant did not specifically state the words "Statute
of Limitation", it should be noted plaintiffs action was a motion brought on the law and
motion calendar before a commissioner and that such motions and responses are typically
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not as specifically plead as pleadings such as answers and complaints. In addition, there
is a reduced time frame for responses in comparison with pleadings such as answers and
counterclaims.
It is clear that defendant discussed the significant length of time that had
passed since the entry of the Decree and plaintiffs failure to act to enforce her interest,
which the defendant argued had already been purchased. The commissioner's
recommendation that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs action was a result of his
review of the defendant's response and affidavit, not an issue that he raised sua sponte
out-of-the-blue. In any event, plaintiff objected to the recommendation and evidentiary
hearings and a trial was subsequently held on all issues raised by the parties.
The purpose of statutes of limitation is to protect parties from the
difficulties inherent in cases that deal with factual issues that have not occurred in the
recent past. Staker v. Huntington justified the trial court's refusal to address a new
defense raised on the day of trial with the following explanation: "Plaintiff's case was not
subject to the evidentiary difficulties that statutes of limitation are designed to prevent,
such as lost evidence, faded memories, and absent witnesses." 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah
1983). The difficulties of providing evidence and the discrepancies attributable to faded
memories that were evident in this case (R. 336, Tr. 91-92, 40-41) are precisely the
reasons that statutes of limitation exist. Even though the defense could have ideally been
pled more specifically, there is no question that the statute of limitations was an issue in
this matter from the very beginning. (R. 336, f 8-12, 16, 17).
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There was no surprise to the plaintiff. Plaintiff had more than adequate
time to prepare to meet the statute of limitations defense. In fact, the defense was
discussed in virtually every argument submitted by the plaintiff in the subsequent
hearings. The plaintiff was given the opportunity to object to the commissioner's
recommendation of dismissal and was given every opportunity to prepare for and present
arguments relating to the statue of limitations issue at subsequent hearings and trial.
Plaintiff urges an extremely strict application of Rules 8(c) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and a very narrow view of the facts when she asks that the statute of
limitations be excluded as a proper issue before the court. In Williams v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 6565 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court specifically addressed Rule
8(c) among the other rules of civil procedure, stating that
they must all be looked to in the light of their even more fundamental
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the
parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. What [the parties] are
entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them.
When this is accomplished, this is all that is required.
The defendant sufficiently raised the statute of limitations issue at the earliest stages of
this action. Plaintiff was in no way prejudiced in her opportunity to prepare for and argue
against the defense. Based upon the facts and the record, Judge Brian correctly ruled that
defendant did not waive the statute of limitations as a defense to plaintiffs action.
2. Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22(1) is applicable to a
property award required to be delivered under the Decree
The trial court properly ruled that the plaintiffs request to require an
affirmation and delivery of her interest in the Company was untimely. The trial court
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properly held that the eight-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated
§76-12-22(1) applied to paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce, and that the plaintiff had
a duty to act to enforce her award within the eight-year statute of limitations.
In her brief, plaintiff/appellant presents several cases (Brief of Appellant,
pp. 12-13) supporting the assertion that Utah courts consider a divorce to be equitable in
nature. Plaintiff argues that, under U.C.A. §30-4-5 and supporting case law, an appellate
court has the equitable power to modify a trial court's division of marital property.
Defendant does not disagree. However, plaintiffs argument is inappropriate. Neither
party has sought to modify the property award under the Decree. The cases cited by the
plaintiff involve requests to review a trial court's division of property, an action that was
taken in this case over twenty years ago. Plaintiff did not request a change in the property
award and now is not the time to revisit the question of equitable property division.
Plaintiff cites 27 A CJ.S. Divorce, Section 94 stating that divorce actions
are not barred by laches if there is a continuing cause of action. This section refers to the
time for filing an action for divorce, and is not applicable to the issue at hand.
The Utah Supreme Court determined in 1978, at the conclusion of the
second appeal of this case, that the property division contained in the Decree of Divorce
was equitable. No change was made to the Decree. At that point, defendant was obligated
to "execute and deliver appropriate instruments evidencing the transfer" of plaintiff s
interest in the Company. (Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 3b, R. 20). If the defendant failed
to act as ordered, the plaintiff would be obligated to bring an action to enforce her rights
under the Decree. There is a time limit set for such actions.
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Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22(1) states that "[a]n action may be brought
within eight years upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any
state or territory within the United States." Utah law is clear that awards of alimony and
child support arrearages are subject to an eight year statute of limitations from the date
the obligation is incurred. U.C.A. §78-12-22(2); Seelev v. Park. 532 P.2d 684, 685 (Utah
1975). Plaintiff cites a Florida case, Johnson v. Johnson. 676 So.2d 458 (Fla. App. 5 Dist.
1988), showing that Florida considers alimony and child support to be equitable in nature
and specifically exempts such obligations from the running of a statute of limitations.
Although both Utah and Florida consider divorce issues to be basically equitable in
nature, Utah and other states have chosen not to provide a blanket exemption for child
support and alimony and subject such awards to a statute of limitations, which in the case
of Utah, is eight years in length. U.C.A. §78-12-22(2). Section 78-12-22(1) similarly
applies to judgments in the State of Utah regardless of whether the underlying action is
equitable in nature or not.
In Mason v. Mason. 597 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court
held that U.C.A. §78-12-22 barred an ex-spouse's attempt to renew the judgment she
obtained for past alimony. The court stated:
the purpose of statutes of limitation is that controversies should not lie
dormant indefinitely, to spring into life and action at the whim or
caprice of a claimant, but should sometime come permanently to rest. It
is for this purpose that the different limitations of the time in which
various actions may be brought, for example as to real property, written
contracts, open accounts, liabilities created by statute, etc.... But the
losing of such causes of action by the lapse of time can be avoided by
filing an action in court within the period so prescribed.
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Id. At 1323. As of June 2, 1978, the date of the decision on the second appeal of the
Decree of Divorce, plaintiff had eight years to enforce the Decree of Divorce in the event
the defendant failed to execute and deliver instruments evidencing the transfer.
Plaintiff cites Shill v. ShilL 765 P.2d 140, (Idaho 1988), in support of her
argument that no statute of limitations should apply, stating that the Idaho Supreme Court
had not recognized the running of a statute of limitations in a case dealing with failure to
deliver pension funds awarded by a decree of divorce. (Brief of Appellant, p. 14).
However, the Shill court was addressing the issue of lack of prosecution, not a statute of
limitations. That court merely declined to reverse the trial court's decision that there was
not lack of prosecution, stating that a factual showing of lack of prosecution "is addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court." (Id. At 143). The Idaho Supreme Court did not
address a specific statute of limitations. In fact, it appears that, unlike Utah, the State of
Idaho does not have a statute of limitations for actions on court orders and decrees.
In a situation virtually identical to the case at hand, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that an Oklahoma statute of limitations barred an action to enforce property
awards under a Decree of Divorce. In Chapman v. Chapman, 692 P.2d 1369 (Okl. 1984),
a spouse sought to enforce her decree of divorce which assigned her the balance of a note
and mortgage. The Oklahoma court denied her cause of action, emphasizing that she
could have brought actions to enforce her interest and failed to timely do so under both a
reasonableness standard and an applicable statute of limitation. Id. At 1375. The court
stated that the party seeking to enforce the decree's property award "could have enforced
the assignment provision by contempt" , could have "given notice to the obligor and
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demanded that he make the payments" , or could have "instituted an action against him to
compel the enforcement of the decree-conferred assignment". Id. Instead, she waited 15
years to institute an action to compel enforcement of the assignment and the court ruled
that her claim was barred as untimely.
It appears that there is no case in this jurisdiction that is directly on point.
However, the clear language of U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) and established case law dealing
with similar awards of property and judgments indicate that an accrued interest awarded
in a Decree of Divorce must be enforced within eight years absent some legally
recognized justification for delay. The Court should follow the decision of the Oklahoma
court. Its decision is more consistent with existing Utah law than those decisions
presented by the plaintiff. The Decree of Divorce awarded an accrued interest to the
plaintiff and ordered the defendant to "execute and deliver" instruments evidencing that
interest. (R. 20). The trial court properly ruled that that U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) applies to
the award, requiring plaintiff to act to enforce the Decree of Divorce within eight years if
the documents had not been delivered.
3. The trial court made an appropriate and supportable
factual finding that defendant's actions did not amount to
estoppel or a lulling or tolling of the statute of limitations
Despite the application of the statute of limitations, plaintiff would still be
entitled to bring an action to enforce the award granted under the Decree of Divorce if
she could prove estoppel or lulling or tolling of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff was
unable to establish this before the trial court. The question as to whether an applicable
statute of limitation was suspended by estoppel, lulled, or tolled, is a question of fact,
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which should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Brower v. Brown. 744
P.2d 1337, 1338-39 (Utah 1987).
The trial court had adequate evidence and testimony before it to support its
finding that there were no facts or actions that constituted an estoppel, lulling, or tolling.
Plaintiff testified that she occasionally received produce from the defendant and alleged
that this evidenced her interest in the Company. (Tr. 15, 24). She also presented
testimony that defendant made promises and delayed delivery of the stock certificates.
(Tr. 13-14, 21-25, 42-44, 146-47, 152). Contradicting this testimony, defendant testified
that plaintiff had not asked him for her stock certificates or other evidence of her
ownership in the Company since 1980. (Tr. 59-60). He testified that she had not asked for
dividends (Tr. 59), had not asked for corporate records (Tr. 67), and had not otherwise
sought to participate in the activities of the Company until she filed suit in late 1994. He
contradicted the plaintiffs testimony, stating that he had never told her he would care for
her financially or hold her stock ownership for her after the divorce. (Tr. 88). He testified
that he had never discussed delivery of the stock as she had testified. (Tr. 64). He testified
that plaintiff had never entered the Company's place of business since the divorce. (Tr.
64-65). Plaintiff testified that she had been in the Company's previous building since the
divorce. (Tr. 33).
The plaintiff testified that the defendant never made a written promise to
deliver evidence of her interest in the Company. (Tr. 45). She testified that she did not
believe there was any injunction or other issue that would have precluded her from
claiming her stock from the date of the divorce. Id. She testified that she never gave the
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defendant authority or proxy to act on her behalf for the Company and that she had no
business dealings with the defendant after 1980. (Tr. 47-48).
Plaintiff testified that she did, however, act judicially to enforce her interest
in child support. (Tr. 51-53; See also Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah
1090) (defendant held in contempt of court for child support delinquencies)). The record
shows that she took no legal action regarding her stock interest until late 1994.
The trial court had an adequate factual foundation to find that the
defendant's actions did not amount to estoppel, lulling, or tolling. The court also had
adequate facts before it to find that plaintiff knew, from the date of the Decree of
Divorce, that documents evidencing her interest in the Company had not been delivered
and that she took no steps to enforce either delivery of the documents or her claimed
interest in the Company's profits and affairs until 20 years after the entry of the Decree.
C. Did the Trial Court err in failing to address the issue of a
constructive trust or to find that a constructive existed in
favor of the plaintiff?
The trial court did not address the issue of a constructive trust in its findings
and accordingly did not find that the plaintiff was the beneficiary of a constructive trust
which would act to hold her interest in the Company in the name of the defendant,
thereby defeating the statute of limitations. The trial court properly excluded this theory
in its findings.
It was not necessary for the trial court to address the constructive trust issue
in light of the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's interest had been previously
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purchased by the defendant. Because the trial court found that the plaintiff had already
been paid for her interest in the Company, the theory of constructive trust was moot. It
also appears that plaintiff did not emphasize the issue of a constructive trust in her Trial
Briefs, which very specifically listed several issues, numbering each issue for the Court,
but mentioned a trust theory only in a footnote (R. 522, fn 2; R. 623, fn 2).
Even if the trial court had found that the plaintiff was not paid for her
interest, there was not sufficient evidence to support the theory of a constructive trust.
The question of whether a constructive trust should be invoked is primarily a question of
fact. See Close v. Adams, 657 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1983): Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177,
1179, (Utah App. 1988) (stating that such a trust must be established by clear and
convincing evidence). A constructive trust may only be imposed by a court upon a
showing of fraud or a confidential relationship between the parties. Hawkins v. Perry,
253 P.2d 372 (Utah 1953). The plaintiff never alleged fraud relating to the failure of
defendant to deliver, or her failure to exercise, her interest in the Company. A
confidential relationship requires the exertion of extraordinary influence or power over
the other party. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); see also Mattes v.
Olearain, at 1179, (holding that affection, confidence, and trust are not sufficient absent a
showing of superiority over the other party). An example of successful assertions of a
constructive trust in Utah involve a sixteen year-old boy and a minister (Hawkins v.
Perry, 253 P.2d 372 (Utah 1953)) and a husband who used harassment and treats of
bodily harm and physical abuse to force his spouse to convey property to him (St. Pierre
v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982)). These elements are not present in this case.
24

The trial court committed no reversible error in failing to address the issue
of a constructive trust in light of its finding that the defendant purchased the plaintiffs
interest in the Company. In addition, there was not sufficient factual evidence to support
the plaintiffs theory.
D. Did the Trial Court render a decision on an issue not
presented before it for determination?
This issue has already been partially addressed in section B1 of the
argument. That section deals with the issue of the alleged wavier of the statute of
limitation defense. In that section, defendant has shown that the statute of limitations
issue was properly before the court and that both the commissioner and the judge were
justified in finding that it was a valid basis for denial of plaintiffs action.
Again, plaintiff cites cases that present situations not comparable to the
case at hand. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 780 P.2d 1264 (Utah App. 1989) and Girard v. Applebv,
660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983) involve cases where an award of attorney's fees was awarded
sua sponte despite the fact that there were no arguments on that issue at trial. Combe v.
Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984) involves a situation where a
trial court dissolved a corporation and distributed the assets when neither party had asked
for such an action. Id. at 735. That court held that "[a] court may not grant judgment for
relief which is neither requested by the pleading nor within the theory on which the case
was tried." and that "[i]t is error to adjudicate issues not raised before trial and
unsupported by the record." In the case at hand, the issue of the statute of limitations was
raised and debated from the beginning. The commissioner's decision was appealed at the
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request of the plaintiff and the parties were afforded the opportunity of presenting issues,
arguments, and evidence to the judge at trial before the final decision was rendered. The
standards set forth in Combe were met.
Plaintiff also contends that it was improper for the court to dismiss the case
as no party had requested dismissal. This is not a sustainable argument. Plaintiffs order
to show cause requested an order "confirming her ownership of such interest in the
company." (R. 328). The trial court's decision to deny her cause of action was a
responsive finding that she had no such interest. Defendant's response to plaintiffs order
to show cause specifically requested that the order to show cause be dismissed. (R. 344).
The trial court appropriately responded to the relief requested by the parties
and based its decision on issues raised by the parties and supported by the record.
E. Should the Defendant be sanctioned for failure to comply
with discovery requests?
The issues of discovery were adequately and specifically addressed by the
trial court in its orders issued in response to defendant's motion for a protective order.
The trial court issued rulings suspending discovery and then later specifically limited
discovery to specific issues. Because the trial court found that plaintiff had been paid for
her interest in the Company and therefore had no current ownership interest, there was no
obligation to order additional discovery on the matter.
While the parties were still attempting to resolve the objections to
plaintiff's proposed order on Commissioner Arnett's recommendation of dismissal,
plaintiff sent discovery requests to the defendant (R. 404) requesting, among various
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other things, information on the Company's current finances, assets, and operations.
Defendant responded to the discovery, and plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Discovery
(R. 415) claiming that defendant's responses were not adequate. Plaintiff then filed a
subpoena duces tecum requesting from the defendant records of "any and all stock, and
any and all record book of the company Kessimakis Produce, Inc." (R. 455). Defendant
responded to the motion to compel and moved for a protective order requesting limitation
of the scope of discovery. Defendant's objections were based on the fact that the
commissioner's recommendation to dismiss the action was currently under review and
that at that stage in the proceedings, the current assets of the Company were therefore
irrelevant and protected. (R. 452, 484)
While a decision on the Motion for a Protective order was pending with the
Judge, the commissioner ruled on plaintiff's Motion to Compel, finding that the
discovery responses were not complete. The commissioner did not address defendant's
motion for a protective order. (R. 479, 514).
Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order was then heard by Judge Brian,
who suspended all motions and discovery pending a hearing before him. (R. 520, 531).
When that hearing was held on December 5, 1996, the court made specific rulings on the
outstanding discovery issues, ordering discovery on specific, limited issues. (R. 598-601).
Discovery was had on those issues with both parties providing all information that they
had under the revised discovery order. After trial, the court held that plaintiff had no
continuing interest in the Company, rendering any further discovery needless and
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inappropriate. The defendant has fully complied with the court's discovery requests and
there are no grounds for sanctions.
F. Defendant/Appellee is entitled to an award of attorney's
fees and costs under rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure
In the event of dismissal of this appeal, defendant should be awarded its
costs and attorneys fees incurred in defending the appeal.
Pursuant to U.R.A.P. 34, "if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed
against the appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court." This
case is an appropriate candidate for an award of costs. The appeal is based primarily
upon plaintiffs objection to factual findings based upon a trial court's careful
consideration of the testimony and evidence before it. The appellant has produced no
credible showing of error in the court's factual findings.
Appellee is also entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to U.R.A.P.
33. This appeal is based primarily upon the appellant's dissatisfaction with the trial
court's factual conclusion. The testimony and evidence of the parties clearly supports the
trial court's finding that plaintiff was paid for her interest. All other issues are secondary.
If the trial court's factual finding is upheld, there exists no good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law and the secondary issues are moot. The issue of sanctions
for discovery is not supported by the face of the record. This appeal is frivolous and
serves no other purpose than to continue to increase the legal fees and litigation costs of
the appellee.
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Appellee should not be penalized financially simply because the appellant
simply wishes to express dissatisfaction with a trial court's findings by filing an appeal.
This is especially true where there exists a sold factual and evidentiary basis for the trial
court's decision. Appellant bears the responsibility for determining whether filing an
appeal is reasonable and should also bear the financial burden of filing appeals that are
not grounded upon reasonably sustainable grounds.

X. CONCLUSION
This is an appeal based primarily on plaintiff/appellant's disagreement with
the trial court's factual findings. The appellant has failed to marshal all of the evidence
to show that the court's findings were clearly erroneous. The testimony before the court
clearly supports the court's interpretation of the evidence, finding that plaintiff was paid
for her interest. That finding should not be disturbed.
If the court's factual findings set forth above are upheld, the issues of the
statute of limitations and constructive trust are moot because the plaintiff accordingly hac
no interest to enforce under these theories. If the factual findings of the court are not
upheld, the plaintiffs arguments on these two issues do not arise to a reversible error for
the reasons set forth above. In a related question, the court committed no reversible error
in making its findings. The court did not make a decision on issues not presented to it,
nor did it make a decision not requested by the parties.
Finally, there is no evidence that defendant failed to comply with plaintiffs
discovery requests. The trial court heard the arguments on plaintiffs motion to compel
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and defendant's motion for a protective order and made an appropriate and specific order
limiting discovery. The parties complied with this order. There is no sustainable
argument in support of sanctions against the defendant on discovery issues.
The trial court's holdings should be affirmed and the appellee should be
awarded costs and attorney's fees.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of October, 1998.
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E.NORDELL WEEKS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
X. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I cause an onginal and seven additional copies of the
foregoing, pursuant to rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to be filed
with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. I also certify that I cause two copies thereof to be
mailed, via United States mail, postage prepaid, on this 6th day of October, 1998, to the
following address:
Mitchell R. Barker, Esq.
Thomas E. Stamos, Esq.
Attorney's for Plaintiff/Appellant
3530 South 6000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84128
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A. Decree of Divorce
B. Plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show Cause
C. Defendant's Response and Affidavit in Support
D. U.C.A. §78-12-22
E. Commissioner's Recommendation, dated January 19, 1995
F. Order dated February 8, 1996
G. Minute entry of the court dated April 16, 1996
H. Order dated February 10, 1997
I. Findings of Fact and Order dated October 17, 1997
J. Excerpts from Defendant's Testimony
K. Index of Record
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS,
Plaintiff,
v.

)

)

DALE M. KESSIMAKIS,
Defendant.

J-/3

-7«t -

$'5Z

(

(

A A/f

DECREE OF DIVORCE.
Civil No. D-14107

)

The above entitled matter having been heretofore heard and
the Court having acquired jurisdictation of the Parties and of the subject
matter of this cause, and having decided the same in accordance with the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on file herein, NOW THEREFORE,
pursuant to said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
1. Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant
on the grounds of mental cruelty, said Decree to become absolute and final
at the expiration of three (3) months from date of entry of this Decree.
2 . The Plaintiff Js awarded the sole care, custody and control
of the minor children of the Parties, subject, however, to rights of visitation
by the Defendant at reasonable times and places.
3 . That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and
separate properties, the following:
a. Residential dwelling at 4520 Atwood Blvd., Murray,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and more particularly described
as follows:

ii>'

"Beginning at a point on the westerly side of Atwood
Boulevard, said point being South 3°12,15M East 265,58
feet and North 39°52'45" East 825.18 to a County Monument
at the intersection of 4500 South and State Street, North
89°5r East along the 4500 South Street monument Line 1437.07
feet, South 0°02'45" West parallel with State Street 200 feet
and South 89°51' West 6.97 feet from the West 1/4 corner of
Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; thence South 1°58'45" West along the West side
of Atwood Boulevard 90.46 feet; thence South 89° 51' West
170.63 feet; thence North 0°02*45" East 76.9 feet; thence
North 89°51' East 80.65 feet; thence North 0°or45 M East 13.5
feet; thence North 89°5' East 93.03 feet to the point of
beginning."
together with all of the furniture, contents and appliances
contained in said family residence;
b. One-Half (1/2) of Defendant's interest in
Kessimakis Produce, Inc., whether the same be evidenced by
stock certificate or otherwise and the Defendant is ordered to
execute and deliver appropriate instruments evidencing the
transfer of such interest;
c . One (1) 1969 Oldsmobile automobile presently
in the possession of the Plaintiff;
d. Personal effects, clothing and such items of
personalty as Plaintiff is in possession of.
4 . That the Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate
property, the following:
a.

His personal clothing and effects;

b. One-Half (1/2) of the interest acquired by the
Defendant in Kessimakis Produce, Inc.;
c . Such other items of personalty now in his
possession except as awarded to the Plaintiff hereinabove.
5.

That the Defendant is ordered and required to pay to the

Plaintiff as support of the three (3) minor children of the Parties the sum of
One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per child per month from and after entry of
this Decree.
-2••s^O

6. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded alimony in the sum of
Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, which the Defendant is ordered
and required to pay.
7. Defendant is ordered and required to pay all debts and
obligations incurred by the Parties during the course of the marriage
including the assumption and payment of the mortgage balances owing on the
family residence described hereinabove.
8. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against the Defendant for
attorney's fees incurred herein in the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00)
together with costs of this action.
DATED, this <*"

day of August, 1974.

BY THE COURT:
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Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
Attorney for Plaintiff
165 South West Temple, # 4 00
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 486-9638

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS,
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE, FOR CONTEMPT, FOR
JUDGMENT AND TO REQUIRE PAYMENT
OR PROPERTY CONVEYANCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. D 14107 (DA)
DALE M. KESSIMAKIS,
Judge 3s*~'*

Defendant.

^

Plaintiff Betty L. Kessimakis, through counsel, respectfully
moves the Court for an order as follows:
1.

Awarding her money judgment against defendant Dale M.

Kessimakis

for

the

value

of

her

interest

in

the business,

Kessimakis Produce Company;
2.

Fixing the amount or value of her interest in the company

and its assets, by evidentiary hearing if necessary;
3.

Confirming her ownership of such interest in the company;

4.

Compelling defendant to buy out and pay her for her

interest;
MOTi

* F?R ORDER TO .-HOW CAUSE,

1

5.

Finding him in contempt of Court for failure to convey to

her the appropriate interest prior to now;
6.

Order a business appraisal of Kessimakis Produce Company

at defendant's expense;
7.

Ordering payment to plaintiff of suit money in the sum of

$2,000;
8.

Authorizing

the

employment

of

a

certified

public

accountant to assist plaintiff in this matter, with the cost and
initial retainer to be borne by defendant;
9.

Awarding attorney fees and costs and such other relief as

the Court deems appropriate; and
10.

Requiring defendant Dale Kessimakis to appear before the

Court at a time and place convenient to the Court, then and there
to show cause, if any he has, why the above relief should not be
granted to the plaintiff.
Respectfully so moved this 10th day of November, 1994.

Mitchell R. Barker, attorney for
Betty Kessimakis, Plaintiff
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flUDDBTWCT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 1 9 1995

E. NORDELL WEEKS (3412)
Attorney for Defendant
320 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 322-2800
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BETTY KESSIMAKIS,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE

li

vs.

Civil No. D 14107 DA

DALE KESSIMAKIS,

)

Defendant.

r

Judge _X ) W ^

COMES NOW the defendant, DALE M. KESSIMAKIS, by
and through his undersigned counsel, E. NORDELL WEEKS, and
hereby files this response to the plaintiff's Motion for
Order to Show Cause.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The Decree of Divorce in this matter was entered
on August 18, 1974.

The plaintiff, at that time, was

awarded a one-half interest in whatever ownership interest
the defendant had in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., a Utah
corporation.

Kessimakis Produce, Inc., was incorporated

on November 12, 1973.

The defendant owned a total of six

thousand (6,000) of the thirty thousand (30,000) shares of
outstanding stock in the corporation at the time of entry
of the Decree of Divorce.
,vV

Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce
herein, the plaintiff is believed to have received, in
1976f from Kessimakis Produce Inc.f a stock certificate
for three thousand (3,000) shares of Kessimakis Produce,
Inc.
Thereafter, the defendant, in 1981 or 1982,
purchased the stock of the plaintiff in Kessimakis
Produce, Inc., for a payment in excess of Twenty Thousand
Dollars ($20,000.00).
ARGUMENT
The defendant, because of passage of time, has
not been able to locate the corporate records or his
personal financial records for the period of time 1980
through 1982, to document that payment has been made.
Certain of the corporation's legal counsel and
accountants for the period 1976 through 1982, are now
deceased and records have been difficult to obtain.
The plaintiff has not, since 1981, made any
demand on the defendant for any evidence of ownership of
Kessimakis Produce, Inc., for financial information,
notice of meetings or otherwise, because she has received
full payment for her interest in the business and knew she
had no on-going ownership interest in Kessimakis Produce,
Inc.
The defendant has served discovery documents on
the plaintiff to obtain her financial records to document
the payment for the stock of Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
2

The Motion for Order to Show Cause was filed by
the plaintiff to vex, harass and annoy the defendant.
Even assuming that the defendant has not paid the
plaintiff (which is disputed), the plaintiff has asked for
relief not provided in the Decree of Divorce and seeks
modification of the Decree of Divorce which cannot be
accomplished by means of an Order to Show Cause.
The defendant was never ordered in the Decree of
Divorce to determine the value of plaintiff's interest in
Kessimakis Produce, Inc., or to purchase the plaintiff's
interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
CONCLUSION
The Order should be denied or the matter set for
evidentiary hearing.
The defendant should be awarded his attorney's
fees incurred herein.
DATED this

/1'

day of January, 1995.

E. NORDELL WEEKS
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to:
Mitchell R. Barker, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
3530 South 6000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
3

by United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, this (U)J>
day of January, 1995.

vt/t^
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E. NORDELL WEEKS (3412)
Attorney for Defendant
320 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 322-2800
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BETTY KESSIMAKIS,
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.

)

DALE KESSIMAKIS,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
DALE KESSIMAKIS

7V
Civil No. D 14107 DA
-p
Judge *VK.lce<.^—-

)
) ss.
)

DALE KESSIMAKIS, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says:
1.

I am the defendant in the above-captioned

2.

Kessimakis Produce, Inc., was incorporated on

matter.

November 12, 1973 (see Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by
reference made a part hereof).
3.

The plaintiff was awarded one-half of any

interest I owned in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., as of the
date of entry of the Decree of Divorce on August 18, 1974.

4.

At the time the Decree of Divorce was

entered, I owned twenty percent (20%) of Kessimakis
Produce, Inc., represented by six thousand (6,000) shares
(see Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by reference made a
part hereof).
5.

Upon information and belief, a stock

certificate was delivered to the plaintiff in the spring
of 1976 in the amount of three thousand (3,000) shares,
representing ten percent (10%) of the stock ownership of
Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
6.

I received a replacement stock certificate

for three thousand (3,000) shares representing my ten
percent (10%) ownership interest in Kessimakis Produce,
Inc.
7.

In or about 1981 or 1982, I paid to the

plaintiff the sum of approximately Twenty-one Thousand
Dollars ($21,000.00) or Twenty-two Thousand Dollars
($22,000.00) for the purchase of her interest in
Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
8.

I have been unable to locate the corporate

records which document the issuance of the stock
certificate in Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
9.

The corporation has had three attorneys since

1974, of which two are deceased and the other does not
have any corporate records.
10.

The present accountant for the corporation,

Michael Smith, was searching for the corporate records of
2

Kessimakis Produce, Inc., to assist in responses to the
plaintiff's Motion herein, but passed away unexpectedly on
January 12, 1995, and the officers and directors of the
corporation have not been able to verify whether or not
the corporate records regarding stock certificates were in
his possession (see Exhibit "C" attached hereto and by
reference made a part hereof).
11.

I have not been able to locate my financial

records for the 1981 and 1982 periods to determine the
date and amounts paid to the plaintiff for her stock.
12.

I believe that the plaintiff will have

deposit slips, stock purchase documents or other financial
records for 1981 and 1982 which will document that she
received sums from me in excess of $20,000.00, for her
interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
13.

I have, through my counsel, served discovery

on the plaintiff, seeking her records for the periods in
question.
14.

The plaintiff never returned to me her stock

certificate for 3,000 shares of stock of Kessimakis
Produce, Inc.
15.

The plaintiff has never made any demand on

me since 1981, for the purchase of her stock or evidence
of her ownership, since she had received full payment for
the stock of Kessimakis Produce, Inc., in 1981 or 1982.
16.

The defendant has never demanded any

financial information or notice of meetings on Kessimakis
3

Produce, Inc., since 1981, as she was aware she held no
interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
17.

This action is without merit and is intended

to harass me.
18.

I have found it necessary to retain an

attorney to defend me in this action.
18.

The plaintiff should be ordered to pay my

attorney's fees incurred in defending this action.
DATED this

//l - day of January, 1995.

XV^V
DALE KESSIMAKIS

this

SUBSCRIBED, sworn to and acknowledged before me
///;M day of January, 1995, by DALE KESSIMAKIS.
s

/
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WENDY K. ROSE

320 Ktamt Building
I Lak* city. Utah $4101

My Committioft Expires
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Nov. 19f 19

- Mailed Corporation Charter to Keith Da

lson.

November 12, 1973
Mr, Keith Dennison
Arch Accounting Service
190 West 2950 South
Salt Lake City, Utah &U115
Re: Utah Incorporation Of:
Kessimakia Produce, Ino,
Dear Keith:
Piled Articles of Incorporation with the Utah Secretary of
State today. Charter will be mailed to my office In about one
week. ~cu should contact the Utah Tax Commission about license,
etc*
Costs expended by ne are as follows, vouchers enclosed:
!•
2*

Secretary of State- Piling Pee
lastats- for 9 photocopies of Articles
TOTAL DUE

$75.00

Please have Hike send me his check for the above amountm
Enclosed $ photocopies of Articles of Incorporation, 2 of
which should be kept in your office, since you will do all the
book work, and 1 given to Hike, Dale and Gary Kessimakia.
If you have any questions, please call roe.
With kind regards, I am,

ATD/md
Enclosures

EXHIBIT "A"

,&z

MHIUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE INCORPORATORS AND SUBSCRIBERS OF
KESSIMAKIS PRODUCE, INC, k3^0

ATWOOD BLVD., MURRAY, UTAH

8*fl07,

held at 5*f6 West 6th South in the city of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on the 12th day of November, 1973 at h o'clock in the
afternoon.
Mr. Mike Kessimakis, a subscriber to the Certificate of Incorporation of
this corporation called the meeting to order.
On motion duly made, seconded and carried, Mr. Mike Kessimakis was
elected chairman of the meeting, and Mr. Gary Kessimakis secretary thereof.
Both these gentlemen accepted their respective offices, and proceeded
with the discharge of their duties. The Secretary then called the roll and
found that the following incorporators and subscribers to the capital stock
were present in person:
None

Address

Number of shares

Mike Kessimakis

^5**0 Atwood Boulevard
Murray, Utah 8^107

18,000

Gary Kessimakis

^5^0 Atwood Boulevard
Murray, Utah 8^107

6,000

Dale Kessimakis

^520 -Atwood Boulevard
Murray, Utah 8^107

6,000

The Secretary then presented and read to the Meeting a copy of the
Certificate of Incorporation of the Company and reported that on the
12th Day of November, 1973* the original thereof was duly filed and
recorded in the office of the Secretary of State, that the organization
tax had been duly paid and that a receipt therefore had been issued by
the Secretary of State on the 12th day of November, 1973 and that a
photostatic copy of said Certificate had been duly filed in the office
of the Clerk of the County of Salt Lake.
Upon motion duly made and carried, it was resolved that said report
be accepted as correct, and the Secretary directed to spread a copy of
such certificate and receipt at length upon the minutes of this meeting.
As prescribed by articles X and XI of the articles of Incorporation
election of officers and directors were voted upon with the following being
duly elected:
Name

. Kike ?Iessimakis

kjkO Atwood Boulevard
Murray, Utah 8^107
EXHIBIT "B"

President & Director
A

Dale Kessiraakis

^520 Atv/ood Boulevard
Murray, Utah 8*fl07

Vice President & Directc

Gary Kessiamkis

^5^0 Atvcod Boulevard
Murray, Utah 8^107

Secretary, Treasurer
& Director

Therebeing no further business before the meeting, the same was, on
motion, duly adjourned.

Dated, the 12th day of November, 1972.

Secre/Baryi of Meeting

Chairman of Meeting

vA

W. Michael Smith
William Michael Smith, age 57, passed away
January 12,1995 In Murray, Utah.
Bom May 24, 1937 in
Salt Lake City, Utah to Archibald Theron a n d
Kathryn Young Smith.
Married Sharon Ruth
Park January 17. 1958,
Salt Lake Temple. An active member of the LDS
Riverside 1st Ward, he
loved music and served
as the ward organist.
Worked in the baptistery
at the Jordan River Temple. He was self-employed as a CPA. Member of the Optimist Club
and the USPA.
Survived by wife, Sharon; children, Sherry (Kelly) Johnson; Meiante Stevens; Miriam (Darren)
Lee; David P. (Heather) Smith; brother, Richard.
Smith; sisters: Margaret "Peggy* Denison; Janet
Noorda nine grandchtklren; and many nieces
and nephews. Preceded in death by his parents
and granddaughter, Kka
Funeral services will be held Monday, January
16,1995.12nooaat the Riverside 1st Ward. 5426
So. 600 West, Murray, Utah. Friends may call Sunday evening from 6-8 p m at Larkin Mortuary,
260 East South Temple, and at the ward on Monday one hour pnor to services. Interment, Larkin
Sunset Gardens Cemetery.
T 1/14
N 1/14

EXHIBIT "C1
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ARTICLE 2
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY
78-12-22. Within eight years.
An action may be brought within eight years:
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the
United States, or of any state or territory within the
United States;
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become due, for
failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent
children1996
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
KESSIMAKIS, BETTY L
PLAINTIFF
VS
KESSIMAKIS, DALE M

CASE NUMBER 744914107 DA
DATE 01/19/95
HONORABLE THOMAS N. ARNETT
COURT REPORTER TAPE 2-1:05-3:90
COURT CLERK KAD

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
MOTION HEARING
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. BARKER, MITCHELL R.
D. ATTY. WEEKS, E. NORDELL

BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND THIS MATTER IS THEREFORE DISMISSED.

TabF

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB

9 1996

*-n

Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
Attorney for Plaintiff
3530 South 6000 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120
Telephone (801) 963-6558

""

beputy Cleric

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

BETTY L KESSIMAKIS,
Plaintiff,
ORDER

,

. _

vs.
Civil No. P-l H07 (DA)
DALE M. KESSIMAKIS,
Defendant.

Judge Brian
Commissioner Arnett

On December 13, 1995 this matter came before the Court pursuant to notice, with the
Honorable Pat Brian. Third District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff Betty Kessimakis appeared through
her counsel. Mitchell R Barker Defendant Dale Kessimakis appeared personally and through his
counsel, E Nordell Weeks.
.After having heard brief arguments from respective counsel, and having reviewed the various
issues and factual disputes pending in this matter, and respective counsel having stipulated to a
hearing, and good cause appearing, it is now therefore
ORDERED as follows:
1. The parties and their counsel shall appear before this Court on February 7, 1996 at 1:00
p m., for an Evidentiary Hearing and argument.

2. The Motion for a Protective Order relating to the Subpoena served upon Kessimakis
Produce, Inc. Is not currently before this Court.
3. At the February hearing, this Court will take evidence and hear arguments on the facts
relating to the applicability of the statute of limitations and other issues which are before this Court.
4. Between now and the February hearing, all current outstanding motions and discovery are
suspended. However, the parties may submit a summary to the Court of the matters which they wish
to have determined at the February hearing.
So ORDERED this

fl

JA

y/^Y

day of J $ W ^ 1 9 9 6 /
BY THE CO

Honorable Pat B. Brian
Third District Court Judge
Approved:

E. Nordell Weeks or Eric Weeks
Attorneys for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l ccrtiiv that on the 17th du\ of Januan 19% I mailed a cop\ of the foregoing to the following individual at the
addie^ indicated In poMaiic piepaid mail
Noidell WeeLv Lsq
brie Weeks. Esq
320 Keams Building
136 South Main #320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

z*#
Mitchell R. Barker

JitMomaJuA, o j\,<Jkjwmaru&, uxcwi.

/^-*_l
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
KESSIMAKIS, BETTY L
PLAINTIFF

VS
KESSIMAKIS, DALE M

CASE NUMBER 744914107 DA
DATE 04/16/96
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG
COURT CLERK BHA

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
HEARING
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. BARKER, MITCHELL R.
D. ATTY. WEEKS, NORDELL E

THE MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT FOR RULING RE: DEF'S MOTION
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER. THE COURT RULES THAT THE PLF'S COLLECTION
ACTION IS BARRED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT TIMELY FILED WITHIN THE
8-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TIME. COUNSEL FOR DEF IS TO
PREPARE THE FINDINGS AND ORDER AND SUBMIT TO THE COURT BY 5/1/96

TabH

Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
Attorney for Plaintiff
3530 South 6000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84128-2610
Telephone: (801) 963-6558

Third Judicial District

FEB 1 0 1997
Deputy Carx *

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.

DALE M. KESSIMAKIS,
Defendant.

Civil No. D-14107(DA)
744910137
7 ^ 7 9 / '//£'7
Commissioner Arnett
Judge: Brian

On December 5, 1996 the above matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on
the issues related to the availability of the statute of limitations defense. The Honorable Pat B. Brian
was presiding. Plaintiff Betty Kessimakis appeared personally, and through her counsel, Mitchell
R. Barker. Defendant Dale M. Kessimakis appeared personally, and through his counsel, Nordell
Weeks and Eric Weeks.
The Court convened a pre-trial conference in chambers at the time appointed for trial. The
in chambers conference involved all of the above parties and counsel.
The Court having heard proffers in chambers, and having been newly shown stock trading
confirmation documents, which were brought to the attention of the Court and of plaintiff for first
time in chambers, entered certain rulings.
Thereafter, a proposed Order was submitted by counsel for plaintiff, to which an objection
Kessimakis vs. Kessimakis, 1

was filed by the defendant, and deemed timely. The Court engaged both counsel in a conference
call, and sustained said objection.
Thereafter, a second proposed Order was submitted by plaintiffs counsel, to which an
objection was also filed by the defendant. The Court engaged both counsel in another conference
call on January 28, 1997, and sustained the objection. This Order is to comport with that ruling.
Now, good cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1.

The trial is continued to March 11, 1997 at 1:00 p.m., which is a second place setting

before Judge Brian.
2.

The Court finds that the plaintiff did not file her order to show cause within the eight

years permitted to enforce a judgement. However, the Court reserves for decision at the upcoming
trial the issues of whether tolling, lulling or other equitable exceptions to the statute of limitations
may apply.
3.

The Court rules that the defendant did not waive the statute of limitations as a

defense in response to the Order to Show Cause in this matter and that the statute of limitations bars
the plaintiffs action absent conduct of the defendant in the nature of tolling, lulling, or other
prejudicial conduct.
4.

Among other things, the Court orders that the parties provide evidence at the trial as

to the Wilson-Davis joint stock account, including when it was opened, why it was opened, who was
involved, how much money was contributed by each of the parties, how much money was generated
Kessimakis vs. Kessimakis. 2

by the account, what happened to the money in the account when it was closed, why it was closed,
and why the parties do not do business together at this time.
5.

Between now and trial the parties may conduct discovery on the above issues and

others, with a discovery cut off date of March 1, 1997. Included in the discovery may be

the

taking of the deposition of plaintiffs brother, Mr. Les Anderton, by the defendant, and the taking
of the depositions of each of the parties by the opposing party.
6.

By January 15, 1997 each of the parties is ordered to produce, through respective

counsel, a complete copy of his or her 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982 federal income tax report.
7.

Both parties shall produce for one another copies of all records in their control

which relate to the joint Wilson-Davis account and, to the extent available, any other stock trading
accounts which were active during 1979 through 1982.
8.

Defendant is ordered to produce by January 15, 1997 a copy of any Will and other

testamentary document in existence which was prepared by or on behalf of Mike Kessimakis, who
is deceased, or which disposes of or purports to dispose of any part of his estate.
9.

The issue of attorney fees claimed by plaintiff, including those related to discovery,

as well as attorney fees claimed by defendant, are reserved for trial.
SO ORDERED t h i y ^ d a y of J^ji&afy, 1 ^
BY THE COURT:

1
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN
Kessimakis vs.

s\f\

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on January 28, 1997,1 faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to the following individual:
Nordell Weeks, Esq.
320 Kearns Building
136 South Main #320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Mitchell R. Barker

Kessimakis vs. Kessimakis, 4
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - ^ i J ^ ^ J SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BETTY KESSIMAKIS,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
CASE NO.

BJJJ'Q-7 DA

v.

DATE:

9 OCT. 1997

DALE KESSIMAKIS,

JUDGE.

PAT B. BRIAN

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court at trial on October 2, 1997 before the Honorable Pat B
Brian, District Court Judge, the Court sitting without a jury. The plaintiff Betty Kessimakis
appeared in person and was represented by counsel Mitchell R. Barker. The defendant Dale
Kessimakis appeared in person and was represented by counsel E. Nordell Weeks.
FINDINGS
1.

The Decree of Divorce between the parties was entered on April 7, 1975.

2.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the plaintiff was awarded (among other assets)

"One-half QA) of the interest acquired by the defendant in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., whether the
same be evidenced by stock certificate or otherwise" and was ordered to "execute and deliver
appropriate instruments evidencing the transfer of such interest."
3.

Although appealed to the Utah Supreme Court twice (Kessimakis v. Kessimakis.

546 P 2d 888 (Utah 1976); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978)), the Decree of
1

Divorce was not modified.
4.

On November 11, 1994, the plaintiff filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause

seeking (I) a money judgment against the defendant for the value of her interest in Kessimakis
Produce (hereinafter the "Business"), (ii) an order fixing the amount or value of her interest in the
Business, (iii) an order confirming her ownership of an interest in the Business, (iv) an order
compelling the defendant to buy out her interest in the Business, (v) an order finding the
defendant in contempt for failure to convey her interest prior to the Motion, (vi) an order for
appraisal of the Business, (vii) a request for court costs, (viii) a request for costs for a Certified
Public Accountant to assist in fixing her amount of interest in the Business, and (ix) attorney's
fees.
5.

The above-stated Motion for an Order to Show Cause was the first legal action by

the plaintiff for enforcement of, affirmation of, or recovery of the assets awarded in the Divorce
Decree
6.

The plaintiff had continuing knowledge that the defendant had not delivered

instruments evidencing the transfer of an interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
7.

The plaintiff failed to attend or request to attend any stockholder's meetings of

Kessimakis Produce, Inc. during all of the period subsequent to the entry of the Decree.
8.

Prior to November 11, 1994, the plaintiff failed to make any written or verbal

demand upon the company or to take any other meaningful action to exercise or demonstrate her
right of stock ownership or to request delivery of instruments evidencing such ownership.
9.

The defendant and plaintiff had communication with each other during all of the
2

years since entry of the Decree of Divorce.
10.

The defendant did not make representations or promises regarding the delivery of

the assets of the marriage which would constitute tolling, lulling, or a stay of the statute of
limitation.
11.

The plaintiff and defendant jointly managed a joint trading account in 1980 from

which both parties could draw funds.
12.

The defendant and the plaintiff established the joint stock trading account as a

device whereby the defendant paid the plaintiff in excess of $20,000 for her stock interest in
Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
13.

The plaintiff failed to take any action to recover the joint stock trading account

funds she asserts were converted to his use upon closing the account.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The statute of limitation set forth in Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22(1) applies to

the matter before the Court.
2.

The defendant has not waived the statute of limitations defense, nor has he waived

his affirmative defenses for payment, release, accord and satisfaction, or novation. Testimony and
evidence in the pleadings and affidavits submitted by counsel and the parties show that these
issues were raised in a timely manner.
3.

The eight-year statute of limitation set forth in Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22(1)

began to run on June 2, 1978, the date of the conclusion of the second appeal on the Decree of
3

Divorce.
4.

None of the defendant's conduct served to lull or otherwise toll or stay the statute

of limitation period.

5.

The plaintiff had eight years, absent a sustainable defense to the running of the

statute of limitation, to bring an action to compel receipt of title to stock in the corporation and
enforce the Decree.
6.

The plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show Cause (which was filed on November 11,

1994) constitutes an "action" under the language of Utah Code §78-12-22(1) and was an attempt
to enforce the Decree of Divorce.
7.

The plaintiff failed to commence an action for enforcement of or execution on her

judgment awarded by the Decree of Divorce until she filed her Motion for an Order to Show
Cause on November 11, 1994.
8.

Plaintiffs action is untimely based on the statute of limitation and the facts,

evidence, and testimony presented to the Court.
9.

Utah Code §78-12-22(1) is applicable to the matter at hand and bars the plaintiffs

Motion.
10.

The facts and testimony indicate that the defendant did not waive the statute of

limitation defense or his affirmative defenses of payment, release, accord and satisfaction, or
novation.
11.

The facts and testimony indicate that the plaintiffs conduct has not constituted a
4

lulling or otherwise toll of the statute of limitation period.
12.

The facts and testimony indicate that the judgment contained in the Decree of

Divorce entered herein has not been stayed, lulled, or tolled.
13.

The facts and testimony indicate that the plaintiff does not have a claim for laches

as relates to the statute of limitation period.
14.

The court is persuaded that in 1980 the plaintiff either received payment for the

awarded interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc. or had the legal right to either contest the
defendant's claim of payment or act to bring action to enforce the award granted in the Divorce
Decree.
15.

The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence and testimony to show that the

plaintiff was paid for her interest and in the less likely event that she was not bought out, she has
failed to contest the payment or enforce the rights under the Decree of Divorce within the statute
of limitation by failing to bring any action to enforce the Decree until November 11, 1994, nearly
14 years later.
16.

The plaintiffs cause of action relating to her affirmation of, collection of, request

for delivery of instruments evidencing ownership of, or any other action relating to enforcing the
Decree's award of "One-Half (Vi) of the interest acquired by the Defendant in Kessimakis
Produce, Inc." is barred.
17.

The plaintiffs contention that defendant should be held in contempt for failure to

comply with plaintiffs discovery requests is without merit. Pursuant to the order of this Court at
a meeting with the parties, all ongoing discovery was stayed and the parties were ordered to
5

produce specific documents requested by this Court.

DATED this f'7

day of

(0 T' A/<U>.,1997
BY THE COURT:

<£-^ U
PAT B. BRIAN, JUDGE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
day of
, 1997,1 caused to be mailed, first
class postage prepaid, a true copy of the foregoing ORDER to:
MITCHEL R. BARKER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
3530 South 6000 West
West Valley City, UT 84120-2610
E. NORDELL WEEKS
ERIC N. WEEKS
WEEKS LAW FIRM
320 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

DATED this

day of

Clerk

7
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

s

/ ? .':•:'/
,,

j

BETTY KESSIMAKIS,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO.

D-44W-7DA

DATE:

9 OCT. 1997

JUDGE:

PAT B. BRIAN

DALE KESSIMAKIS,
Defendant.

THIS MATTER was called and heard at trial before the Honorable Pat B.
Brian, District Court Judge, sitting without a jury. The plaintiff, Betty Kessimakis, appeared in
person and was represented by counsel, Mitchell R. Barker. The defendant, Dale Kessimakis,
appeared in person and was represented by counsel, E. Nordell Weeks. The Court, having heard
the arguments, testimony, and evidence presented by the parties and witnesses, and having
conducted a review of the applicable law, legal precedent, and documents and pleadings on file
herein, and being fully advised thereto, having previously entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs action for enforcement of the Decree of Divorce is untimely and is

1

» **> A

hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2. Plaintiff has no ownership interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
MADE AND ENTERED this / ?

day of October, 1997.

BY THE COURT:

•^t

HONORABLE PATBTBRIAN ^ >
District Court Judge

2

<<a^-
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1

THE COURT:

2

Any other witness?

3

MR. BARKER:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. BARKER:

6

THE COURT:

Counsel, call your witness.

7

MR. WEEKS:

Like to call Dale

8

You may step down.

No, your Honor.
You rest?
I do.

Kessimakis, please.
DALE KESSIMAKIS.

9
10

called as a witness by the defendant, being first

11

duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT

12
13
14
15
16
17

EXAMINATION

BY MR. WEEKS:
Q.

Mr. Kessimakis, please state your name a

address, please.
A.

Dale Kessimakis.

I live at 10980 South

1300 East, Sandy, Utah.

18

Q.

Where are you employed, Mr. Kessimakis?

19

A.

Kessimakis Produce.

20

Q.

It is true, I guess, that you had a

21

difficult divorce?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And that you subsequently went to the

24
25

Supreme Court a couple of times?
A.

Yes.

54

Q.

Did you continue to have difficult times

with your ex-wife?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What kind of relationship did you have?

A.

It was on and off.

Q.

What was the relationship right after you

Mostly not that good.

finished in the court actions?
A.

We didn f t really get along that good right

after the divorce.
Q.

For how many years after?

A.

Oh, I would say probably a couple of years.

Q.

Did you ever make an attempt in the period

after the Court actions to reconcile?
A.

No.

Q.

Did your father, Mike, like your former

A.

No, he did not.

Q#

Had he ever indicated to you that he wanted

wife?

to see that she was protected?
A.

Never.

He never thought very much of

Betty.
Q.

What was the impetus to try and buy her out

of the -- of her interest in the company?
A.

Well, I opened the stock account, and with

some help from my father and some other income that I

55

had, I put some money into the stock market, along
with Betty, and it was our agreement that I would buy
her out for $25,000 for her share of the Kessimakis
Produce.
Q.

Was your father the instigator of that

joint account?
A.

Pardon?

Q.

Was your father the instigator of that

account?
A.

No.

Q.

But he did help you fund it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And the purpose of it was to buy out her

interest?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What did you think the company was worth in

A.

I would say probably $10,000 to $15,000.

Q.

Your share in it?

A.

That's the total amount.

Q.

That it would have been worth?

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q.

So it was just a family business?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you have discussions with Betty about

1980?

56

the opening of that account?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Where were the discussions held?

A.

I think she stopped over at my place.

Q.

Did you discuss this plan to buy her out?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What did she say?

A.

She said that was fine.

Q.

Was there a reason why you put the stock

account in one stock brokerage as opposed to another?
A.

Well, Les was the brother, and I figured

that he would do a real good job, because he was
investing for both of us.
Q.

That was Les Anderton?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Why was her name put on the joint account

with you?
A.

Well, she was —

I really don't know why,

to tell you the truth.
Q.

Was that the suggestion of someone, I

guess?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did the account go to her, the account

mailings, did that information go to her?
A.

Yes.

And I think I received some, too.

57

Q.

Did she have the authority to trade in the

account, buy and sell?
A.

Not to my knowledge.

Les usually took care

of most of the buying and selling.
Q.

So he handled it, but she had the authority

to pick stocks?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did she do that?

A.

I really don't remember.

Not to my

knowledge.
Q.

So it was an account that either one of you

could have access to?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Could she have taken money out?

A.

She could have.

Q.

Do you know if she took money out?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

How did the money come out of the account?

A.

Les would sell stocks, and then he would

send me the checks.
Q.

Then what would you do with the checks?

A.

I would cash them.

Q.

Then give them to her?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So you paid her in cash?

$8

A.

Yes.

Q.

Has that always been your practice?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you ever paid alimony in anything but

A.

I pay alimony and everything in cash.

Q.

Have you recently changed your practice of

I always pay cash for everything.

cash?

paying other than cash on alimony?
A.

Yes.

Q.

When did you do that?

A.

After the lawsuit.

Q.

Before that you had never paid anything by

check?
A.

No, always cash.

Q.

So you have no check records at all?

A.

No.

Q.

Betty knew that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So you would get money out of the joint

account, and it would go to Betty as cash?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you paid it to her?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you pay her all of the proceeds of that

account?

5

A.

She got approximately $25,000.

Q.

And the rest, you got?

A.

Yes.

Q.

That was pursuant to your arrangement with

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did she ever make demand on you for the

her?

proceeds of that joint account?
A.

No.

Q.

She has never said anything about it until

the last couple of years?
A.

She has never said anything.

Q.

Was that your understanding that she was

being paid for her stock in Kessimakis Produce?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Did she ever, since 1980, ask you for stock

in Kessimakis?
A.

No, she never has.

Q.

She has never said to you, "When am I going

to get my stock?"
A.

Never.

Q.

Never said, "When do I get my dividends?"

A.

Never.

She has never even spoken about

dividends, ever.
Q.

Ever talked about getting stock

60

1

certificates or going to meetings?

2

A.

No, nothing.

3

Q.

This account was not set up to try and

4

reconcile the marriage?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

You were living with someone else?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

I direct your attention to Exhibit A, and

9
10

ask you if you are familiar with that stock trading
account, and the accounting that's with that?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Did you prepare the little, hard-copy pages

13

that are attached to that, that shows the profits and

14

losses?

15

A.

My girlfriend, my former girlfriend, did

Q.

She did that at the time the account

16
17
18

that.

trading was going on?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

She did that under your

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

As the trades were made?

23

A.

Yes.

24
25

MR. WEEKS:

instructions?

I would like to move for

admission of Exhibit A.

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. BARKER:

Any objection?
I need to look at it, I

3

guess, based on what was just testified to.

4

I wasn't aware there was a summary
THE COURT:

5
6

attached.

You may approach the

witness and examine the exhibit.
MR. BARKER:

7

I have no objection to

8

admission of Exhibit A, with the exception

9

of the two attached pages, just because I

10

don't have a copy, I don't think, and I am

11

not familiar with their contents.
THE COURT:

12
13

attachments, Counsel?
MR. WEEKS:

14
15

What are the two

them.

They are kind of hard to describe.
THE COURT:

16

Let me let you look at

17

on foundation.

18

Q.

You ought to make a record

Mr. Kessimakis, you indicated these were

19

prepared as your trades were made in the joint

20

account?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Is this a format that you set up?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

This what I call a Venetian blind or

25

something that kind of folds?

And you sat there.

62

Did you sit with the girl and show her what to do and
write down here?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That was off trading slips; is that

correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that, basically, is a —

your own

record of the trading slips as they came in?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Why did you do your own record in addition

to trading

slips?

A.

I just wanted to keep track of everything.

Q.

Do they show more -- these little hard

pages show a little different view of the account
than the trading

slips?

A.

No, I don't think so.

Q.

You think they are exactly like the trading

slips?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do they show more information than the

trading slips show?
A.

I don't think so.

Q.

You say they are just taken right off

there?
A.

Yes.

They are right off the trading slips.

Q.

In your presence?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Under your supervision?

A.

Yes.

Q.

By your girlfriend?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was her name?

A.

Claudia Zinner.

Q.

How long did you live with Claudia?

A.

Probably about I would say around seven

.

Q.

During 1980 you were living with Claudia?

A.

Yes.
MR. WEEKS:

I have no other questions,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

Any objection to the

exhibit?
MR. BARKER:
time, please?

May I see it one more

I have no objection to it

being admitted, as long as we are talking
about illustrating what those sheets say,
which is what he has testified to, if I can
have a photocopy of them.
THE COURT:

The exhibit is received.

The clerk will provide copies at the break.

64

Other questions?
Q.
account.

Let me ask you about the opening of the
You indicated, briefly, that you went to

Les Anderton, and that's Betty's brother?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You opened the account there.

Was there a

reason to use Les?
A.

Yes.

I thought he would do a good job, and

he was Betty's brother and a friend of the family.
That's the reason why I chose him.

He had a good

track record.
Q.

Mr. Kessimakis, Betty has testified that

you went to a 7-Eleven at one point in 1973, or '83.
I guess it was 1993.

She testified you went to the

7-Eleven to talk to her.

Do you recall going to a

7-Eleven to talk to her about stock in the company?
A.

I have never been to a 7-Eleven to talk to

her about stock.
Q.

Never on any occasion?

A.

Never.

Q.

Do you recall the last time Betty was in

the Kessimakis Produce, either location?
A.

I don't ever remember her ever coming in.

Q.

Since the divorce?

A.

No.

I never remember seeing her ever come

65

in.

I don't think she would show her face in the

produce

company.

Q.

Why is that?

A.

Because my brother dislikes her.

And I

don't think she would have nerve to come in.
Q.

So, to your recollection, she has never

been in Kessimakis Produce?
A.

Never.

Q.

In either location?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you have occasion to call Betty and

tell her that Mike wanted to talk to her?
A.

I never did.

Q.

You have never asked her to go talk to Mike

about financial -A.

My father dislikes her immensely.

He would

never ask me to call her.
Q.

Do you know if she went on her own?

A.

He would never invite her over.

Q.

Did he leave you a larger share of stock in

the company?
A.

I really don't know.

Q.

You don't recall?

A.

No, I don't.

Q.

What stock, what percentage of the stock do

66

you own now?
A,

Right now?

Q.

Right now.

A.

Fifty percent.

Q.

And your brother Gary owns the other

50 percent?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So that you didn't get any extra share in

the split in the estate?
A.

No, I did not.

Q.

The estate was settled in 1981; is that

correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

There was no real estate in the company, so

there was no reason for her to call you about any
inheritance or anything out of Mike's estate that was
real estate that the company may have had an
ownership interest in?
A*

No.

Q.

Did ycu have occasion to try and get tax

returns for the 1980 years, '81,
A.

Yes.

f

82?

But -- we tried to get them, but they

were not available.
Q.

You couldn't get those?

Over the years you

have heard her make statements that she talked to you

67

on several occasions about getting your stock.

Did

you give her any indication she was going to get
stock after 1980?
A.

No, I did not.

She never said a thing.

Q.

Did you tell her she was in your will for a

fourth?
I don f t even have a will.

A.

No, I did not.

Q.

How many children do you have?

A.

Three.

Q.

But nobody —

you have never told her that

she was a fourth heir of your estate?
A.

No.

Q.

What is your title in the company?

A.

President.

Q.

Have you ever had any requests from Betty

or her attorney for corporate records?
A.

Just recently.

Q.

Since the lawsuit was filed?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Nothing prior to that?

A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever, in your capacity as an

officer in the corporation, ever had any occasion to
give her notice of annual meetings?
A.

She was never in the company, so I had no
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405-406
407
408
409-411
412
413
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08-21-95
08-25-95
08-25-95
09-01-95
09-01-95
09-01-95
09-05-95
09-07-95
09-12-95
09-12-95
09-12-95
09-12-95
09-18-95

09-21-95
09-21-95
10-31-95
10-31-95
11-02-95
11 -29-95
11-30-95
12-03-95
12-03-95
12-04-95

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING
REPLY MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
MINUTE ENTRY
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DOCUMENTS ONLY
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER PERTAINING TO THE PLAINTIFF'S
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED ORDER
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER
LETTER FROM E. NORDELL WEEKS
LETTER FROM MITCHELL R. BARKER
MINUTE ENTRY
CASH FLOW ANALYSIS
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED ORDER
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER
NOTICE TO SUBMIT AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
LETTER FROM E. NORDELL WEEKS
OBJECTION TO NOTICE TO SUBMIT AND RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER AS TO SUBPOENA
MEMORANDUM RESPONDING TO OBJECTION TO ORDER
LETTER FROM MITCHELL R. BARKER

414
415-416
417-418
419-449
450-451
452-453
454
455-456
457-458
459-463
464-465
466-477
478
479-482
483
484-485
486-491
492-493
494-495
496-497
498-499
500-502
503-506
507-509
510-513
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12-07-95
12-08-95
12-13-95
02-04-96
02-09-96
02-09-96
02-26-96
02-27-96
03-04-96
04-16-96
05-02-96
05-08-96
05-20-96

07-18-96
12-30-96
12-30-96
01-02-97
01-02-97
01-17-97
01-27-97
01-28-97
01-30-97
02-10-97
03-06-97
03-06-97

ORDER
NOTICE OF HEARING ORAL ARGUMENT
MINUTE ENTRY
TRIAL BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
NOTICE
LETTER FROM MITCHELL R. BARKER
ORDER
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF
MINUTE ENTRY
MEMORANDUM
NOTICE
MINUTE ENTRY
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
NOTICE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ORDER AND DECREE
NOTICE OF HEARING
MINUTE ENTRY
LETTER FROM MITCHELL R. BARKER
LETTER FROM E. NORDELL WEEKS
MINUTE ENTRY
LETTER FROM MITCHELL R. BARKER
LETTER FROM E. NORDELL WEEKS
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION
MINUTE ENTRY
NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF DEPOSITION
ORDER
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY
AFFIDAVIT OF E NORDELL WEEKS

514-517
518-519
520
521 -526
527-528
529
530-531
532-538
539
540-544
545-546
547
548-549
550-552
553-554
555-556
557-562
563-565
566-567
568
569-573
574-579
580
581 -586
587-592
593-594
595
596-597
598-601
602-603
604-608
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03-06-97
03-10-97
05-28-97
06-05-97
06-12-97
10-01-97
10-02-97
10-02-97
10-17-97
10-17-97
11-17-97
12-15-97
12-15-97
12-15-97
02-20-98
02-20-98
04-24-98
04-27-98
04-28-98
02-20-98
02-20-98

AFFIDAVIT OF GARY KESSIMAKIS
DEFENDANT'S DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES
MINUTE ENTRY
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING
LETTER FROM MITCHELL R. BARKER
NOTICE
TRIAL BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
EXHIBIT LIST
MINUTE ENTRY
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ORDER
NOTICE OF APPEAL
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT ORDER
LETTER FROM MITCHELL R. BARKER
LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT
COPY OF FIRST PAGE OF TRANSCRIPT
COPY OF FIRST PAGE OF TRANSCRIPT
LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT
LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT
LETTER FORM COURT OF APPEALS
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON 5- 28-97
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON 10-2-97

609-611
612-613
614
615
616
617-618
619-629
630
631
632-638
639-640
641-642
643-644
645
646
647
648
649
650-651
652-652A
653
654

